The Insiders' Game - (Princeton Studies in International History and Politics) by Elizabeth N Saunders

About the Book

"One of the most important virtues of a democracy is that its leaders are accountable to the public, which presumably makes democracies more cautious about using military force and, ultimately, more peaceful. Yet how, then, are some leaders able to continue or even escalate wars in the face of strong or rising popular opposition, as Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon did in the later stages of the Vietnam War, and Barack Obama did in Afghanistan? In this book, Saunders argues that constraints on democratic leaders' decisions about war come not from the public but from elites, making war an "insiders' game." Saunders sees elites as a disparate group that can shape not only the decision about whether to enter a war but also how wars unfold. The insiders' game can sometimes result in elites effectively colluding with leaders in escalating a war with dim prospects; it can also occasionally lead to de-escalation or the end of a conflict. Saunders focuses first on the importance of elite influence (rather than public accountability) and on how the preferences of elites differ from those of the public. She homes in on three main groups of elites that shape almost every war-related decision democratic leaders make: legislators, military leaders, and high-level bureaucrats and advisers. She then goes on to look at how these dynamics have played out historically, looking at the cases of Lebanon, Afghanistan, Korea, and Vietnam, showing that leaders' political bargaining with elites is key to understanding the use of force in American foreign policy"--

Book Synopsis

How elites shape the use of force in American foreign policy

One of the most widely held views of democratic leaders is that they are cautious about using military force because voters can hold them accountable, ultimately making democracies more peaceful. How, then, are leaders able to wage war in the face of popular opposition, or end conflicts when the public still supports them? The Insiders' Game sheds light on this enduring puzzle, arguing that the primary constraints on decisions about war and peace come from elites, not the public.

Elizabeth Saunders focuses on three groups of elites--presidential advisers, legislators, and military officials--to show how the dynamics of this insiders' game are key to understanding the use of force in American foreign policy. She explores how elite preferences differ from those of ordinary voters, and how leaders must bargain with elites to secure their support for war. Saunders provides insights into why leaders start and prolong conflicts the public does not want, but also demonstrates how elites can force leaders to change course and end wars.

Tracing presidential decisions about the use of force from the Cold War through the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, Saunders reveals how the elite politics of war are a central feature of democracy. The Insiders' Game shifts the focus of democratic accountability from the voting booth to the halls of power.

Review Quotes

"Winner of the Foreign Policy Best Book Award, International Studies Association"

"A Chicago Council on Global Affairs Read of the Year"

About the Author

Elizabeth N. Saunders is professor of political science at Columbia University. She is the author of Leaders at War: How Presidents Shape Military Interventions.