Us Diplomacy and the Good Friday Agreement in Post-Conflict Northern Ireland - (Key Studies in Diplomacy) by Richard Hargy (Hardcover)

About the Book

This book revises our understanding of US intervention in Northern Ireland, 2001-2007. Within the context of 9/11 and America's subsequent response, this work will reveal the vital role played by the George W. Bush administration in the region and why this was critical to the restoration of the Good Friday Agreement's institutions in May 2007.

Book Synopsis

Richard Haass and Mitchell Reiss, as autonomous diplomats in the George W. Bush State Department, were able to alter US intervention in Northern Ireland and play critical roles in the post-1998 peace process. Their contributions have not been fully appreciated or understood. The restoration of Northern Ireland's power-sharing government in 2007 was made possible by State Department-led intervention in the peace process. There are few references to Northern Ireland in work examining the foreign policy legacy of the George W. Bush presidency. Moreover, the ability to control US foreign policy towards the region brought one of George W. Bush's Northern Ireland special envoys into direct diplomatic conflict with the most senior actors inside the British government. This book will uncover the extent of this fall-out and provide original accounts on how diplomatic relations between these old allies became so fraught.

From the Back Cover

US diplomacy and the Good Friday Agreement in post-conflict Northern Ireland provides an essential revision of the post-1998 period in Northern Ireland and the significance of US involvement in the region. The George W. Bush administration's intervention from 2001 to 2007 was decisive and remains undervalued and misunderstood. Throughout this time, the State Department managed American intercession with responsibility for strategy falling to two special envoys: Richard Haass and Mitchell Reiss.

The Good Friday Agreement was one of the twentieth century's least expected peace settlements. The accord, however, did not deliver immediate stability to Northern Ireland. The institutions of the agreement lay paralysed within a few short years and the country was in fragile and deeply entrenched ethno-nationalist stalemate. This book pioneers a new scholarly approach to this period. It combines a rigorous analysis of the contemporary development of the State Department and Policy Planning Staff, the context of US foreign policy between 2001 and 2007, and the political roller-coaster that was Northern Ireland post-1998. Fascinating insights from important political and diplomatic actors are provided, many of whom offer accounts that hitherto have not been heard. The book also illustrates how State Department-led intervention in Northern Ireland strained the 'special relationship' even as it enjoyed a resurgence under George W. Bush and Tony Blair, an intriguing and unreported occurrence in the history of post-conflict Northern Ireland.

In May 2007 the institutions of the Good Friday Agreement were restored. This volume reveals how this would not have happened without the strategic interventions by two State Department diplomats.

About the Author

Richard Hargy is a Visiting Scholar at the Centre for the Study of Ethnic Conflict at Queen's University Belfast.